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Abstract
We study what determines taxpayers’ deduction behavior when filing tax returns. Pre-
liminary deficits might be viewed as losses assuming zero preliminary balance as ref-
erence point. Swedish taxpayers may escape these losses by claiming deductions after
receiving information about the preliminary balance. Furthermore, the Swedish income
tax system has a substantial kink (20 percentage points) where the central government tax
applies. Taxpayers slightly above the governmental tax kink have substantially higher
(standard economic) incentives to claim deductions than taxpayers slightly below the
kink. Using a regression kink and discontinuity approach with individual fixed effects,
we study a panel of 4.1 million Swedish taxpayers in 1999 to 2006. We find strong causal
effects of preliminary deficits on the probability of claiming deductions. The initial em-
pirical evidence for a kink in deduction probability at the central government threshold,
anticipated by standard economic theory, is weaker but significant. However, a more
detailed analysis reveals that the kink at the tax threshold is not likely due to the tax
incentives per se. When controlling for the preliminary tax deficit, the kink at the tax
threshold disappears. Taxpayers just above the tax kink are namely more likely to run
a preliminary tax deficit than those just below it. Hence, the most plausible explana-
tion also for the kink at the tax threshold is therefore loss aversion and not standard
economic incentives. The Swedish taxpayers are thus “misbehaving”, in a Thaler (2015)
sense, on two separate margins: they are highly loss averse but surprisingly inattentive
to standard monetary incentives.
Keywords: tax compliance, loss aversion, prospect theory, quasi-experiment, regression
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1 Introduction
Recently, tax deductions have been attracting attention in the literature. E.g., Doerrenberg
et al. (2017) find that deductions are important tools of adjusting taxable income, in the
same way as e.g., Kreiner et al. (2014) find that top managers may retime bonus payments
and shift regular income across the years in response to tax reform. Paetzold (2018) stud-
ies low-income Austrians and finds strong evidence that they use deductions to target
kink points. Matikka (2018) finds small, but still responses from marginal tax rates on
work-related deductions in Finland. Hence, there are studies that indicate that deduction
behavior may be important to consider when analyzing the elasticity of taxable income.
However, deductions (just as many other things) may also be used in less rational ways.
Engström et al. (2015) find that having taxes due increases the likelihood of claiming a
certain deduction by about 50 percent compared to expecting a refund. Also Rees-Jones
(2018) finds evidence that people use deductions in a loss averse manner when filing their
tax returns.
With a panel covering the universe of Swedish working-age taxpayers during eight years
we analyze and compare two competing deduction motives, namely loss aversion and the
standard neoclassical one. We analyze loss aversion by comparing deduction behavior
among those who have taxes due and those who expect a refund. The neoclassical motive
is analyzed by making use of the largest and most salient kink in the tax schedule and
comparing behavior depending on marginal tax rate.
In April, Swedish taxpayers receive their pre-filled income tax returns from the Tax
Agency. It contains information about third-party reported incomes from the previous
year and the taxpayer either confirms all the reported items, or has the possibility to make
changes, e.g., claim deductions. Together with the tax return, the Tax Agency attaches a
preliminary tax balance. Based on the third-party reports and taxes withheld, the taxpayer
may have taxes due or may get a refund. On the last row it is stated how much one is
expected to pay or get back based on the preliminary records.1 This information allows us
to analyze whether loss aversion matters for claiming deductions. We think of taxpayers
who are informed that they have taxes due as facing a loss, while those who expect a refund
face a gain. If those with a loss are more likely to claim deductions than those in the gain
domain, we may conclude that tax filers act in a loss averse manner. The other piece of
information we make use of is about the central government tax. On the information sheet
taxpayers are informed how much they pay to the local government and if and how much
to the central government. Most Swedish taxpayers only pay tax to the local government.
However, above a certain income (SEK 306,000 in 2006) an additional 20 percent is paid
to the central government.2 Hence, at the kink point, the marginal tax rate increases from
1See Figure 18 in the appendix.
2In 2006, this income corresponded to EUR 33,063.
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about 31 % to 51 %. This is the largest and most salient kink point in the Swedish income-tax
schedule and one gets clear information whether one is above or below the kink at the time
of filing. If taxpayers respond according to the standard neoclassical model, they would be
more inclined to claim deductions when facing the higher marginal tax rate.
We use a regression kink and discontinuity approach to analyze whether there is a
causal effect from the two running variables (initial tax deficit and income, respectively)
to actual tax filing behavior. This regression technique allows us to eliminate potential
problems of endogeneity and selection by comparing those slightly below to those slightly
above the specific threshold (where the initial tax deficit is zero and the threshold for the
marginal tax rate, respectively). The specific behavior we analyze is whether or not one
claims deductions for “other expenses for earning the income”. The reason for restricting
the analysis to this specific deduction rather than including all tax-sheltering measures
available is that we want an action with as little potential selection as possible. This tax-
manipulation tool is available to everyone to the same extent. It could contain more or less
anything and one is not punished for trying even if the deduction shows to be erroneous.3
There are other kinds of deductions available to Swedish taxpayers, but they are all due to
specific requirements, such as a sufficient commuting distance or certain saving schemes.
Hence, the specific deduction of our study is the most easily accessible way to reduce tax
liability in a legal or illegal way. We find that those who have a small tax deficit (taxes due)
are significantly more likely to claim this particular deduction than those who expect a
small refund. However, we find no corresponding effect along the neoclassical dimension.
We thus conclude that the Swedish taxpayers are misbehaving in two respects: they are
both loss averse and inattentive of the monetary values of the deduction.
Rees-Jones (2018) and Engström et al. (2015) are two recent contributions that also find
that taxpayers use deductions in a loss averse manner when filing their tax returns. Using
cross-sectional data covering 3.6 million Swedish taxpayers, Engström et al. find that those
with taxes due are significantly more likely to claim deductions than those who expect a
refund. Analyzing available covariates, they draw the conclusion that the effect is causal
and that loss aversion is indeed driving the deduction behavior. However, there are limits to
cross-section analysis, where one cannot control for any unobserved heterogeneity, which
could affect both the probability of ending up with a deficit and the propensity to claim
deductions. Therefore, the present study, which uses panel data and fixed effects to control
for unobserved heterogeneity, gives a more credible result, but confirms the conclusions
drawn by Engström et al. (2015). Rees-Jones makes his study in the US context and regards
tax manipulating measures in general. He finds that such measures are much more likely
for taxpayers with taxes due than for those who expect a refund. When separately studying
different kinds of tax manipulations, he shows that itemized deductions seems to be a very
important component in reducing tax liability. His analysis is a bit different from ours:
3According to RSV (2001), after random audits 90–95 percent of the deductions were not approved.
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While we study the likelihood of claiming deductions, Rees-Jones analyzes the magnitude
of tax manipulation by studying bunching at the threshold between loss and gain. He finds
extensive excess mass, indicating that tax manipulation is indeed used to avoid ending up
with taxes due.4
This loss averse tax-filing behavior may be contrasted with standard neoclassical theory,
according to which one is instead more inclined to deduct when the monetary value of the
deduction is higher. To test this motive, we make a corresponding analysis of deduction
behavior near the threshold for central governmental income tax, where the marginal tax
rate increases by 20 percentage points. Initially, we find a small effect indicating that a
larger share of those just above the tax threshold claim the deduction than of those just
below it. However, there is a mechanical selection effect where those just above the tax
kink are significantly more likely to have taxes due than those just below it. When we
control for the preliminary deficit (i.e., the loss-aversion motive), the neoclassical effect
totally disappears. Hence, our results are far from those by Doerrenberg et al. (2017), who
find that German taxpayers’ deductions are responsive to changes in marginal tax rates
and by Paetzold (2018), who finds that deductions are used to target a salient kink in the
Austrian tax structure. In his study, low-income earners and part-time workers constitute
the studied subjects contrary to much of the existing tax-sheltering literature, which to a
large extent deals with high-income earners. A yearly income below EUR 10,000 was tax
free in Austria, while the marginal tax rate was 38.33 percent on incomes exceeding that
amount. One reason for the large discrepancy between our results and Paetzold’s may thus
be that his studied kink is not only a larger discrete jump (38 compared to our 20 percentage
points); it is also a jump from zero to a strictly positive marginal tax rate. Claiming the
deductions below the kink is of no use when the tax liability is zero, while our Swedish
taxpayers have a positive return from deductions also below their kink.
Paetzold (2018) concludes that Austrian taxpayers are highly aware of the salient tax
kink and adjust their deductions accordingly. Flood et al. (2013) find that Swedes are not
particularly knowing about exactly where the first central governmental tax kink is, so it is
tempting to explain the lack of response along the neoclassical dimension with ignorance.
However, although the exact location of the kink is not that well-known, Flood et al. (2013)
also find that a majority of employees have a good knowledge of their marginal tax rate.
In addition, at the same piece of paper where it says whether one has taxes due or may
expect a refund, one gets informed about whether one pays central-governmental tax or
not; hence, although people may not be aware of the exact kink, they should have a good
view of whether they are above or below it.
Our results corroborate those by Bastani and Selin (2014), who focus on the same
4There are also earlier studies using actual tax payments indicating that the threshold between taxes due and a
refund is correlated with compliance, see, e.g., Cox and Plumley (1988), Chang and Schultz Jr (1990) and Persson
(2003). Although they point in the same direction as Rees-Jones (2018) and Engström et al. (2015), these studies
have not been able to prove causality.
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Swedish tax kink, but not specifically on the same deduction as we do. They find almost
no bunching in taxable income around the tax kink among wage earners, in contrast to
self-employed, who have access to many more measures to adjust their taxable income and
therefore bunch at this kink point to a very large extent.
Since we focus on one specific deduction among several, it makes little sense to analyze
it in terms of bunching, like Paetzold (2018), Bastani and Selin (2014) or Rees-Jones (2018).
They are all mainly interested in excess mass in the ex post distributions of taxable income
near kinks relevant for loss aversion or neoclassical theory. Thereby the total amount
of deductions and/or other measures to reduce tax liability becomes relevant. We are
instead, just like Engström et al. (2015), interested in what affects actual behavior, in our
case claiming a specific deduction. We therefore estimate the likelihood of claiming this
deduction at either side of two thresholds, relevant for two deduction motives.
In a completely different setting, List (2003) compares neoclassical theory with prospect
theory in the sportscard market. In his experiment, loss aversion had strong predictive
power for inexperienced subjects, while those who were experienced were more likely to
behave according to neoclassical theory.5 In our study, age could be a proxy for experience.
When running separate regressions for older and younger taxpayers, we do find that
the loss-aversion kink is more pronounced for the younger, but also the older and more
experienced taxpayers are significantly loss averse. Moreover, neither young nor old react
to neoclassical incentives. Hence, our results suggest that the threshold between taxes due
and a refund is more salient than the one concerning the marginal tax rate also among
experienced taxpayers. Information about both margins is given together with the tax
return, but only the information about the sign and magnitude of the deficit affects the
probability to claim deductions for "other expenses for earning employment income".
The paper proceeds as follows. The two competing theories are described more formally
and predictions for the empirical analysis are made in Section 2. Section 3 explains the
Swedish setting and our data, followed by some descriptive results in Section 4. Section 5
provides the results from our regressions and Section 6 concludes the paper.
5However, also Pope and Schweitzer (2011) find significant loss aversion among highly experienced agents,
namely professional golfers.
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2 Theoretical predictions
This section aims at giving a short theoretical motivation for our following empirical sec-
tions. In subsections 2.1 and 2.2 we briefly present the two competing theories and what
they predict in terms of deduction behavior.
2.1 Prospect Theory
Originally, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) defined prospect theory, of which we mainly
focus on reference dependence and loss aversion. Rather than a utility function of an ab-
solute amount of e.g., income, prospect theory implies a value function where outcomes
are evaluated in relation to a reference point. Receiving more than the reference point is
considered a gain, while receiving less is a loss, which is also more salient than a corre-
sponding gain. That loss averse individuals value losses more than gains implies that the
value function is kinked at the reference point. In our particular application a zero balance
in preliminary tax payments is such a reference point. Having some taxes due then implies
a higher marginal value of extra income than getting a refund of the same amount. Those
with a preliminary tax deficit would consequently be more inclined to take the chance of
claiming a deduction.6
2.1.1 Predictions using prospect theory
Here, we illustrate what predictions for deductions that could be made from prospect theory.
The following is mainly part of the model and the predictions presented in Engström et al.
(2015), to which we refer for further details.
Consider a taxpayer, i who is to decide on whether or not to claim the (fixed size)
deduction δ > 0, a deduction which comes at a cost ci, which may vary across taxpayers;
ci ∼ U[0, c¯].7 Prior to a potential deduction, the taxpayer has received information about
the preliminary tax balance, Dpi , where D
p
i > 0 implies a preliminary deficit, i.e., more taxes
due, and Dpi < 0 implies a refund (a negative deficit). We assume that D
p
i = 0 constitutes
the reference point. With a constant marginal tax rate t > 0, the monetary value of the
deduction is always tδ. However, for a loss averse individual, the value depends on Dpi
and whether δ would alter the domain one ends up in. Denoting the value of an outcome
VB, the value of claiming the deduction is
6See, e.g., Yaniv (1999), Bernasconi and Zanardi (2004), and Dhami and al Nowaihi (2007) for theoretical results
on the link between loss aversion and tax compliance. Also the models presented by Engström et al. (2015) and
Rees-Jones (2018) show that measures to reduce tax liability are more frequent in the loss than in the gain domain.
7The cost may be administrative (Benzarti, 2017) or moral if the deduction is not fully legitimate.
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VB(Dpi − tδ) − VB(Dpi ) =

νtδ if Dpi ≤ 0
ν(tδ + Dpi (λ − 1)) if Dpi ∈ (0, tδ]
λνtδ if Dpi > tδ
(1)
where λ > 1 is the coefficient of loss aversion.8 These values are also illustrated in Figure
1. The individual claims the deduction, δ if the value as reported in (1) exceeds the cost,
ci. Since the cost of claiming the deduction, ci ∼ U[0, c¯], we can easily predict the share of
taxpayers who claim δ for the three segments of Dpi , which is illustrated in Figure 2. For
expositional reasons we have assumed a fixed deduction δ, but also if we do not restrict
the deductions to be of fixed amounts, Engström et al. (2015) show that "The share of
individuals who claim a positive deduction will kink upwards at D = 0 and the share of
individuals who claim a deduction will always be higher on the deficit side".9
It is obvious that we would expect a larger share claiming δ among those with taxes due
(Dpi > 0) than among those who get a refund (D
p
i < 0). We are, however, interested in what
happens at the very kink, where Dpi = 0. Note that the derivative of s depicted in Figure 2
is not defined in Dpi = 0. Hence, the kink is really defined as the difference in the derivative
if we approach zero from above and from below. The kink is thus defined as:10
8λ = 1 corresponds to the neoclassical case.
9Engström et al. (2015), Prediction 4.
10The share in the middle segment (where Dp approaches 0 from above) is defined as
s(Dp) =
ν(tδ+Dp(λ−1))∫
0
f (c)dc =
ν(tδ + Dp(λ − 1))
c¯
for Dp ∈ (0, tδ]. (2)
and the derivative of this share is
∂s
∂Dp
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Dp=0+
=
ν(λ − 1)
c¯
. (3)
The share claiming δ in the gain domain (where Dp approaches 0 from below) is
s(Dp) =
νtδ∫
0
f (c)dc =
νtδ
c¯
for Dp ≤ 0, (4)
where the derivative with respect to Dp is
∂s
∂Dp
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Dp≤0
= 0. (5)
Thus, the kink is defined as the difference between (3) and (5):
∂s
∂Dp
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Dp=0+
− ∂s
∂Dp
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Dp=0−
=
ν(λ − 1)
c¯
− 0.
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∂s
∂Dp
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Dp=0+
− ∂s
∂Dp
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Dp=0−
=
ν(λ − 1)
c¯
− 0 = ν(λ − 1)
c¯
≡ β1,B. (6)
According to (6) there will be a positive kink at the reference point whenever the
coefficient of loss aversion, λ > 1 and the stronger the loss aversion, the more pronounced
will the kink be. Hence
Prediction 1. If loss aversion motivates deduction behavior, the share of taxpayers who claim the
deduction is higher among those with taxes due than among those who get a refund in the proximity
of the reference point, Dp = 0. Moreover, the share kinks at Dp = 0.
(6) also shows that the kink, i.e. the change in the slope, is independent of the tax rate.11
However, from (1) it is clear that the value of claiming the deduction is increasing in the
tax rate. Hence, a larger share of the taxpayers should find it worthwhile to claim the
deduction when facing a higher tax rate.
Prediction 2. A larger proportion of taxpayers in the loss and gain domains, respectively, claim the
deduction when the marginal tax rate is higher. Even though the slope of the kink is independent of
the tax rate, the domain with positive slope will be proportional to the tax rate, which means that the
kink will disappear as the tax rate tends to zero.
11What values of DPi are considered a "small deficit", however, depends on the tax rate, implying that the width
of the middle segment (tδ) is larger for higher tax rates.
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V B
Dpi
Surplus
Small deficit
Large deficit
tδ
νtδ
tδ
ν(tδ −Dpi (1− λ))
tδ
λνtδ
Note: The value of a deduction of size δ given three initial values of preliminary deficit, each denoted
by a black circle. The x-axis, Dpi , denotes preliminary deficit, and the y-axis, V
B, the value derived from
the deficit. The horizontal lines in the two triangles and the quadrilateral denote the amount by which
the deficit decreases, tδ, where t is the marginal tax rate. The vertical lines in the two triangles and the
quadrilateral denote denote the value of the deduction, where ν is the marginal value of consumption
(assuming linear utility), and λ is the coefficient of loss aversion.
Figure 1: Value of deducting in a behavioral model
8
0s
Dpi
tδ
Slope: ν·(λ−1)c¯
Note: The share of individuals claiming a deduction as a function of preliminary deficit Dpi . Each
individual can claim a deduction of a fixed size δ, at a cost ci ∼ U(0, c¯), and has a marginal tax rate of t.
A linear utility is assumed, where ν is the marginal utility of consumption, and λ is the coefficient of
loss aversion.
Figure 2: Share deducting in a behavioral model
2.1.2 Extreme loss aversion
Most studies define loss aversion as just creating a kink at the reference point. I.e., the value,
VB at the reference point is the same if we approach it from below or from above, while the
slopes differ. However, in their theoretical model Diecidue and Van De Ven (2008) consider
an "extreme version of loss aversion", which also includes a jump.12 With this notion, there
is a discrete value loss from ending up in the loss domain, irrespective of how large the loss
is. In our context, this would imply that not only the marginal value of income is higher in
the loss domain, there would also be a fixed drop in the value from ending up with taxes
due, which we denote µ. In presence of such value reduction, the benefit from claiming the
reduction that brings the taxpayer from the loss to the gain domain would be even larger
than from the mere kink, as depicted in Figure 3
12See, e.g., Levy and Levy (2009) and Allen et al. (2017) for empirical evidence.
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µV B
Dpi
Surplus
Small deficit
Large deficit
tδ
νtδ
tδ
µ+ ν(tδ −Dpi (1− λ))
tδ
λνtδ
Note: The value of a deduction of size δ given three initial values of preliminary deficit, each denoted
by a black circle. The x-axis, Dpi , denotes preliminary deficit, and the y-axis, V
B, the value derived from
the deficit. The horizontal lines in the two triangles and the quadrilateral denote the amount by which
the deficit decreases, tδ, where t is the marginal tax rate. The vertical lines in the two triangles and the
quadrilateral denote denote the value of the deduction, where ν is the marginal value of consumption
(assuming linear utility), and λ is the coefficient of loss aversion.
Figure 3: Value of deducting in a behavioral model with a jump
The counterpart to (1) including a jump, thus reads:
VB(Dpi − tδ) − VB(Dpi ) =

νtδ if Dpi ≤ 0
ν(tδ + Dpi (λ − 1) + µ) if Dpi ∈ (0, tδ]
λνtδ if Dpi > tδ
(7)
The difference in value of δ where Dp approaches 0 from above and below is then
s(Dp)|Dp=0+ − s(Dp)|Dp=0− =
∫ ν(tδ+µ)
0
f (c)dc −
∫ νtδ
0
f (c)dc =
νµ
c¯
≡ β0,B (8)
Prediction 3. If extreme loss aversion motivates deduction behavior, the share of taxpayers who
claim the deduction is higher among those with taxes due than among those who get a refund in the
proximity of the reference point, Dp = 0. Moreover, the share jumps at Dp = 0, where the magnitude
10
of the jump is β0,B =
νµ
c¯ > 0.
2.2 Neoclassical Theory
2.2.1 Predictions using neoclassical theory
Let us now turn to the neoclassical case, where the taxpayer is not loss averse, but merely
cares about the monetary outcome. We still let taxpayer i choose whether or not to claim the
fixed deduction δ, which comes at cost ci ∼ U(0, c¯). The monetary value of the deduction
depends on the marginal tax rate. Denote income above the kink Ii and let t0 be the marginal
tax rate below the kink and t0 + τ the marginal tax rate above it. For comparability with the
behavioral model, we still denote the marginal utility of income ν. The value of claiming
deduction δ in a neoclassical model is then:
VNC(Ii − δ) − VNC(Ii) =

νt0δ if Ii ≤ 0
ν(t0δ + τIi) if Ii ∈ (0, δ]
ν(t0 + τ)δ if Ii > δ
(9)
These values are illustrated in Figure 4. Also here, the individual claims the deduction
if its value exceeds the cost. Since the value of δ depends on Ii and these incomes vary
across individuals, we can predict the shares of taxpayers who claim δ for different values
of Ii, which is illustrated in Figure 5.
According to the neoclassical model, we would expect a larger share claiming δ among
those with gross income above the tax kink than among those below it and just like in the
behavioral model, we are interested in what happens at the very kink where Ii = 0:
The derivation of the neoclassical kink is analogous to that of the behavioral:13
13The share claiming δ in the middle segment (I approaches 0 from above) around the neoclassical kink is
s(Ikink) =
ν(t0δ+τI)∫
0
f (c)dc =
ν(t0δ + τI)
c¯
for I ∈ (0, δ], (10)
which we differentiate with respect to income:
∂s
∂I
∣∣∣∣∣∣
I=0+
=
ντ
c¯
≡ β1,NC. (11)
The share claiming δ with marginal tax rate t0 (where I approaches 0 from below) is
s(I) =
νt0δ∫
0
f (c)dc =
νt0δ
c¯
for I ≤ 0, (12)
where the derivative with respect to I is
∂s
∂I
∣∣∣∣∣∣
I=0−
= 0. (13)
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∂s
∂I
∣∣∣∣∣∣
I=0+
− ∂s
∂I
∣∣∣∣∣∣
I=0−
=
ντ
c¯
≡ β1,NC. (14)
According to (14) there will be a positive kink at the tax kink, and the larger the increase
in marginal tax rate, τ, the more pronounced will the kink be. Hence
Prediction 4. If neoclassical theory motivates deduction behavior, the share of taxpayers who claim
the deduction is higher among those with marginal tax rate t0 + τ than among those with marginal
tax rate t0. Moreover, the share kinks at the tax kink.
V NC
Ii
Below kink
Slightly above kink
Well above kink
δ
νt0δ
δ
ν(t0δ + τIi)
δ
ν(t0 + τ)δ
Note: The value of a deduction of size δ given three initial values of taxable income, each denoted by a
black circle. The x-axis, Ii, denotes taxable income relative to the first central government kink (CGK),
and the y-axis, VNC, the value of the forgone consumption due to taxes. The horizontal lines in the
two triangles and the quadrilateral denote the amount by which the taxable income decreases, δ. The
vertical lines in the two triangles and the quadrilateral denote the value of the deduction, where ν is
the marginal value of consumption (assuming linear utility), t0 is the marginal tax rate below the first
CGK, and τ is the jump in the marginal tax rate at the first CGK.
Figure 4: Value of deducting in a neoclassical model
Thus, the kink is defined as the difference between (11) and (13):
∂s
∂I
∣∣∣∣∣∣
I=0+
− ∂s
∂I
∣∣∣∣∣∣
I=0−
=
νt0δ
c¯
− 0.
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0s
Ii
δ
Slope: ν·τc¯
Note: The share of individuals claiming a deduction as a function of taxable income relative to the first
central government kink (CGK) Ii. The marginal tax rate is t0 below the first CGK, and jumps by τ at
the kink. Each individual can claim a deduction of a fixed size δ, at a cost ci ∼ U(0, c¯), and has a linear
utility, where ν is the marginal utility of consumption.
Figure 5: Share deducting in a neoclassical model
3 Data and Institutional settings
Our data set is a panel covering all Swedes 16–67 years old with employment income,
filing their tax returns for the income years 1999–2006. The upper age limit depends on our
dependent variable, the deduction for “other expenses for earning employment income”,
as retirees do not make such earnings.14
Sweden has a dual income-tax system, where capital income is taxed at a flat national
rate of 30 percent and employment income is taxed progressively and by both the central
and local governments.15 Focus here is entirely on employment income, which is taxed
individually and not based on household income. The marginal tax rate as a function of
taxable income in 2003 is shown in Figure 6.16 Most Swedes only pay the local employment
income tax, which in 2003 ranged from 28.90 to 33.72 percent (after general deductions).
Above a threshold (SEK 284,300 in 2003) an additional 20 percent is paid in central govern-
mental income tax and another 5 percent on the taxable employment income that exceeds a
14People could of course retire earlier or go on working longer, but since we cannot distinguish between earned
and pension income, the age limit 67 is the best indicator we can get.
15See Engström et al. (2015) for a more detailed description of the Swedish tax system and the tax-filing
procedure.
16The structure has been approximately the same during the full study period, although the exact income
thresholds have increased over time.
13
second threshold that was SEK 430,000 in 2003.17 Although the local marginal tax rate dif-
fers across municipalities, the income thresholds for the central government tax is the same
for the whole country and in our analysis we will focus on the first central governmental
kink (CGK), where the marginal tax rate increases by 20 percentage points.
Our objective is to study the deduction behavior when filing the tax returns. During the
income year, employers withdraw preliminary taxes and pay directly to the Tax Agency.
The following year, tax returns are sent out to the individuals together with information
about how much earnings one had the previous year, how much taxes one paid, how much
taxes one should pay (divided into local and central governmental taxes) and consequently
whether one could expect a refund or to pay taxes due.18 The individual taxpayer is then
able to make changes, e.g., claim deductions, before submitting the tax return to the Tax
Agency, which then decides on the final taxes. For most taxpayers the actual tax liability
does not differ very much from the preliminary tax payments, so the initial deficit or
surplus tends to be rather small; see Figure 8 for the distribution of initial balances. Since
employment income is third-party reported, there is little room for taxpayers to make
changes in their tax returns. At the time of our study, however, deductions exceeding SEK
1,000 for “other expenses for earning employment income", were allowed.19 A wide range
of expenses are approved if they are essential for earning the employment income, but not
provided by the employer.20 The taxpayer only has to claim the amount on the tax return;
no receipts have to be submitted unless there is an audit. Although many expenses are
in principle deductible, the requirements for approval are often high. In random audits,
90–95 percent of the claims were not approved and especially claims in the range SEK 1,000
– SEK 5,000 were found to be erroneous.21 In some cases taxpayers may simply not be
aware that they are not entitled to the deduction, but in other cases they may take a chance
to reduce their tax in an evasive manner. Such a chance is risk free as the worst thing that
could happen is that the deduction is not approved – there is no punishment for trying to
deduct expenses you had. In spite of that, only a minority of taxpayers actually claimed
this specific deduction during the years of our study. Figure 7 shows that only 9 percent
made claims.
We want to study the causal effect of: i) the preliminary tax balance and; ii) the taxable
income relative to the first governmental tax threshold, on the likelihood of claiming the
deduction. Hence, we want the exact balance and gross taxable income announced by
the Tax Agency to be exogenous to the tax payer, in the sense that it is not perfectly fine-
tuned by the taxpayer. We therefore want to exclude individuals who have almost perfect
control over their preliminary balance and/or their taxable income. The most important
group to exclude is the self-employed since they have various possibilities to adjust their
17In 2003, these incomes corresponded to EUR 31,150 and EUR 47,125, respectively.
18See Figure 18 in the Appendix for an example.
19The law changed 2007. Deducted amounts now have to exceed SEK 5,000.
20It could be safety equipment, tools, phone calls, office space, etc.
21See RSV (2001) and Persson (2003).
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taxable incomes as well as various deduction possibilities that are not available to wage
earners. Bastani and Selin (2014) find that the self-employed, unlike wage earners, bunch
at the central governmental tax threshold, which indicates that they, to a large extent can
manipulate their taxable earnings. In our analysis, we regard a person as self-employed
if income from self-employment (or from a closely held corporation) is not zero for a
particular year. Hence, some individuals are included some years, but not others due to
self-employment.22 Furthermore, we restrict the analysis of the preliminary balance to
taxpayers with “normal” taxable incomes. We follow Engström et al. (2015) and define
normal incomes as in the range SEK 100 000 to SEK 1 000 000 (2012 year prices). Note
that this requirement makes us exclude those with incomes in the interval essential to the
study by Paetzold (2018), who analyzes deductions among Austrian taxpayers around the
threshold income EUR 10,000, where the marginal tax rate jumps from 0 to 38 %.
The construction of our samples is summarized in Table 1. Our full sample for re-
gressions using the preliminary balance as a running variable (after conditioning on age,
wage-earners, and normal incomes) constitutes 31.3 million observations.
When studying the causal effects, we need the individuals not to have perfect control
(or, even knowledge) over the size of the running variable in relation to the threshold.
The closer we get to the threshold, the higher is the likelihood that this is truly exogenous
to the individual. E.g., for someone who ends up with more than SEK 20,000 in taxes
due, this probably does not come as a surprise (and may be due to some specific actions
during the income year). In our regressions, we therefore restrict our sample to those
who are most likely to exogenously end up at either side of the threshold. In their cross-
section analysis, Engström et al. (2015) chose a preliminary tax balance of ± SEK 3,000 as
their maximum bandwidth. Our much larger data set allows us to reduce the bandwidth
further; hence, our maximum bandwidth is a preliminary tax balance of± SEK 1,000. Table 2
shows descriptive statistics of both the full sample and of the maximum bandwidth sample
consisting of 4.9 million observations when using preliminary deficit as running variable.
Engström et al. (2015) found a positive correlation between income and the absolute value
of the preliminary tax balance. It is therefore expected that when we reduce the bandwidth
to ± SEK 1,000, mean income in the sample is also reduced.
This maximum bandwidth sample consists of the roughly 15 % observations closest
to the threshold with a zero preliminary tax balance. For comparison, we would like a
maximum bandwidth of similar magnitude around the threshold where the marginal tax
rate increases by 20 percentage points. A majority of the Swedish income earners are well
below the CGK, so including about the same share of the taxpayers requires a rather large
bandwidth. We let the maximum bandwidth be a yearly income of ± SEK 30,000 relative to
the CGK, which covers 5.2 million observations.23 The taxpayers should not be able to affect
22If we adopt the definition of Bastani and Selin (2014), where those who have self-employment income in one
year are excluded in every year our results remain approximately unchanged.
23This corresponds to a difference in monthly income of about ± EUR 250 in 2012 prices
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exactly where they end up in this interval. This is not a farfetched assumption considering
the results by Bastani and Selin (2014) who find no tendency of bunching around the CGK
among wage earners contrary to self-employed who target the kink to a very large extent.
The descriptive statistics of this sample are displayed to the right in Table 2. We see that
the preliminary deficits differ a lot for those below and above the CGK, an issue we will get
back to in the empirical analysis.
The first CGK
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Figure 6: The first central government kink
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Full Wage Normal
Year sample Age(a) earners(b) incomes(c)
1999 9,008,295 5,875,852 5,322,137 3,819,912
2000 9,029,641 5,903,322 5,354,095 3,900,235
2001 9,057,050 5,941,469 5,398,746 3,942,001
2002 9,092,831 5,986,053 5,341,214 3,894,046
2003 9,130,827 6,032,367 5,392,919 3,900,059
2004 9,169,342 6,080,230 5,459,212 3,928,715
2005 9,213,475 6,132,942 5,519,067 3,941,170
2006 9,283,538 6,205,656 5,603,847 3,984,526
Total 72,984,999 48,157,891 43,391,237 31,310,664
(a) Between 16 and 67 years old.
(b) (a), and do not have income from self-employment.
(c) (a), (b), and have taxable income (in 2012 prices) between 100,000 and
1,000,000 SEK.
Table 1: Construction of samples
Full sample
Maximum bandwith sample
for prel. deficit regressions
Maximum bandwith sample
for taxable income regressions
All
Prel.
surplus
Prel.
deficit All
Below
first CGK
Above
first CGK All
Number of obs. 31,310,664 2,794,279 2,131,102 4,925,381 3,024,678 2,191,967 5,216,645
Deducting, share .09 .074 .087 .079 .124 .131 .127
Preliminary deficit(*) 1.85 -.51 .47 -.09 -.16 1.12 .38
Has preliminary deficit, share .35 0 1 .43 .29 .35 .32
Taxable income(*) 266.2 224.6 227.5 225.9 291.6 321.7 304.3
Above CGK, share .26 .13 .15 .14 0 1 .42
Men, share .51 .47 .47 .47 .63 .67 .65
Age, years 44.2 42.9 44.3 43.5 44.3 44.8 44.5
Moving, share .04 .03 .03 .03 .03 .03 .03
Unemployed, share .12 .16 .17 .16 .05 .04 .05
Marginal tax rate, % 38.4 36.1 36.5 36.3 31.6 51.1 39.8
Note: The maximum bandwidth sample usded for regressions with preliminary deficit as running varable has preliminary
deficit in the interval ± SEK 1,000 (2012 prices).
Note: The maximum bandwidth sample usded for regressions with taxable income relative to CGK as running varable has
preliminary deficit in the interval ± SEK 30,000 (2012 prices).
(*) SEK 1,000 (2012 prices).
Table 2: Descriptive statistics
4 Graphical evidence
In this section we present graphical evidence of the deduction pattern in relation to the
two thresholds: the zero preliminary balance and the central government tax threshold.
Figure 7 and 9 below can be thought of as the empirical counterparts to the key theoretical
predictions in Figures 2 and 5 above. Furthermore, we present the corresponding frequency
plots over the thresholds in Figures 8 and 10. These provides initial graphical evidence
of potential selection patterns in relation to the thresholds, which would weaken a causal
interpretation of any apparent effects. The formal tests of the covariates behavior over the
17
threshold, and the corresponding graphical evidence, are left to Section 5 below.
As can be seen from Figure 7 below, the deduction pattern around the zero preliminary
balance matches the theoretical predictions in Figure 2 almost perfectly. The deduction rate
remains relatively flat on the surplus side (left of the cut-off) and begins a dramatic increase
as soon as we enter the deficit side. The simple theory based of equal sized deductions for
all also predicts a negative kink at tδ to the right of the cut-off. As discussed in Engström
et al (2015), this kink will not prevail in a more realistic model with endogenous deduction
size. Hence, we would not expect it to show up in the empirical evidence. Turning to Figure
8, we see no graphical evidence of selection based on the frequency distribution over the
cut-off – the frequency evolves smoothly over the cut-off.
Figure 9 below shows the corresponding deduction pattern in relation to the central
government tax break. Figure 5 above shows the theoretical prediction of a positive kink
at the threshold also in this case. Just as for the preliminary deficit case, the negative kink
at δ on the positive side is an artificial effect stemming from the unrealistic assumption that
everyone makes deductions of the same size. We would therefore not expect this negative
kink to manifest in the data, and there is no graphical evidence of its presence. What is
more interesting is that there is hardly any evidence of a kink at the cut-off either, at least
not as clear as for the behavioral kink discussed above. There is a small tendency of a
positive kink at the threshold but we leave it to the formal analysis to show whether it is
statistically and/or economically significant. We conclude this section by noting that the
frequency plot in Figure 10 does not show any signs of selection in relation to the threshold
– the frequency evolves smoothly over the threshold.
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Figure 7: Deductions by preliminary deficit
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Figure 9: Deductions by taxable income
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5 Regression analysis
5.1 Baseline models
In this section we formally test whether there is a causal relationship between: i) preliminary
deficits and deductions and; ii) taxable income relative to the first CGK and deductions.
Below we refer to preliminary deficits and taxable income relative to the first CGK as the
running variables. We follow some of the empirical strategies suggested in previous work
on the regression discontinuity design (Lee and Lemieux, 2010) and regression kink design
(Card et al., 2009). The empirical tests essentially consist of answering two questions:
• Does the relationship between the running variables and deductions have a statisti-
cally significant kink and/or discontinuity around the reference points?
• Can we rule out corresponding statistically significant kinks and/or discontinuities
for the predetermined covariates?
If the answer is "yes" to both these questions, it is reasonable to interpret the relationship
as causal. Using the fixed effects model, we estimate the probability of claiming a deduction
and our available covariates as spline models allowing for kink, as well as for discontinuity
specifications (additional covariates and yearly dummies, are suppressed):
∆it =
κ∑
k=0
αkxkit +
κ∑
k=0
βkΥitxkit + ηi + τt + it, (15)
where ∆it is the outcome variable, xit is the running variable, Υit is an indicator for a
positive running variable, ηi is the individual fixed effect, τt year fixed effects, and it is an
error term. The coefficient α0 measures the intercept, β0 measures a potential discontinuity
at the reference point (zero preliminary deficit or taxable income at the first CGK), and
β1 measures a possible kink at the reference point.24 The polynomial κ will be set to 1
throughout the analysis. The analysis is thus limited to the linear polynomial. This seems
reasonable from the graphical evidence and given the relatively narrow bandwidths we
will be using. However, in some cases we will find it necessary to make robustness checks
using the second order specification.
The additional covariates used in both the behavioral and neoclassical specifications
are: i) an indicator for whether the tax payer has moved to a different municipality since
last year and ii) an indicator for whether the tax payer has received unemployment benefits
during the income year. Both these variables are indicators of dramatic changes in the
tax-payers economic circumstances, that may affect deduction behavior as well as both
running variables, i.e. preliminary deficit and distance to the CGK. Standard controls such
24c.f., the theoretical expressions in (6), (8) and (14).
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as age, gender and home municipality will be automatically dropped due to the inclusion
of individual fixed effects.
In addition to the two general controls we will add the following specific controls in
respective specification. In the behavioral regressions we will include a linear income effect
as well as the interaction between taxable income and an indicator for being above the CGK.
In the neoclassical analysis we will, by symmetry, include the preliminary deficit and the
interaction between preliminary deficit and an indicator for positive preliminary deficit.
We thus control for the neoclassical margin when analyzing the behavioral response, and
vice versa. As sensitivity checks we have also included all the corresponding quadratic
controls and we have found the results robust to these alternative specifications.
5.2 Loss aversion
Figure 7 suggests that something drastic is happening right at a zero-balance, but we cannot
be certain that the pattern is not due to selection, i.e. that some unknown feature of the
preliminary tax system makes individuals that are relatively deduction prone during the
specific year to sort into the deficit side. Using the fixed effects model, we estimate the
probability of claiming a deduction as a function of preliminary deficit. That is, in the
estimated specification (15), the running variable xit is now preliminary deficit. Using
symmetric bandwidths around the zero reference point, we iterate the estimation for a
large number of bandwidths, starting from a preliminary deficit of SEK ±1,000 at the
most (4,925,831 observations) to SEK ±200 at the least (1,034,940 observations). Figure
11b shows the discontinuity estimates, i.e., the estimates of β0 for the various bandwidths.
It is clear that the larger bandwidths give more precise estimates due to a larger sample
size. However, the discontinuity is stable and significant for all bandwidths. Also the kink
estimates, i.e., the estimates of β1 are relatively stable and significant at bandwidths of ±600
(3,023,424 observations) and above, as shown in Figure 11a.
There is clear evidence that the probability of claiming the deduction significantly both
kinks and jumps at a zero reference point, even when we include individual fixed effects.
Furthermore, the kink estimates are of similar magnitudes as in Engström et al (2015),
which used only 2006 data and no fixed effects. Engström et al (2015) varied the bandwidth
between SEK ±3000 and SEK ±500 and the kink estimate turned insignificant around
SEK±700. It is thus reassuring that the kink estimate remains significant as low as SEK±200
in the fixed effect estimation with additional years. A discontinuity is not predicted by a
standard version of loss aversion, but rather from an extreme loss aversion model that also
includes a fixed cost of losing, as noted in section 2.1.2 above. The discontinuity estimate
in Engström et al (2015) was unstable and dropped towards zero for small bandwidth.
In contrast, our fixed effects estimate is stable and statistically significant albeit arguably
economically insignificant.
The next step in the analysis is to check whether the covariates also kink and jump at
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the reference point. The graphical evidence is reported in Figure 12 below. The income
measure looks problematic, see Figure 12a. There is a negative slope on the surplus side
and a positive slope on the deficit side, and the relationship seems to kink almost at zero
deficit. This pattern is no surprise since it looked very similar in Engström et al (2015).
Furthermore, there is a simple intuitive explanation for the pattern. The preliminary tax
rates are chosen with zero deficit (or a very small surplus) as the target. Now, any deviation
from zero will scale up proportionately with higher income. This means that there will be
a mechanical relation between income and the expected absolute distance to the target, i.e.
zero or a very small surplus. The fact that the income measure kinks close to zero is thus
not a sign of unobservable selection, which is what we are afraid of; it is possible to control
for observable selection but not for unobservable selection. The formal estimates of kinks
and discontinuities in the income variable are shown in Figure 13a and Figure 13b below.
There is no indication of a discontinuity but the kink is picked up by the model and remains
statistically significant for bandwidths larger than SEK ±650.
We now turn to the two last covariates, the residence change and unemployment in-
dicators. The raw graphical evidence is reported in Figures 12b and 12c. There is no
graphical evidence of any dramatic changes around zero preliminary deficit for any of the
two variables. The formal analysis confirms the graphical evidence. Figure 13d shows the
discontinuity estimates for a dummy variable indicating whether individuals have changed
residence. Again, we conclude that there is no significant discontinuity in that variable.
Similarly, when looking at the kink estimates in Figure 13c we find no significant kink.
The same goes for the indicator for receiving unemployment benefits: Figure 13e and 13f
indicate no statistical kink or discontinuity at the reference point.
Engström et al. (2015) estimate a somewhat larger coefficient of loss aversion among
younger taxpayers than among older although the difference is not significantly different.
As a robustness check, we therefore split our sample and run separate regressions for
taxpayers above and below 40 years of age. The results are available on request and
corroborate those from Engström et al: The kink estimates are significant, indicating that
both age groups are indeed loss averse. For bandwidths smaller than SEK 700, there is no
significant difference between the groups.
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(b) Loss aversion discontinuity from FE estimation
Note: FE estimates and 95% confidence intervals of β1 (11a) and β0 (11b) from (15), using a dummy
variable indicating deductions for “other expenses” as outcome variable (∆it), preliminary deficit as
running variable (xit), κ = 1, and a triangular kernel.
Figure 11: Kink and discontinuity from FE estimation in loss aversion analysis
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Figure 12: Loss aversion covariates by deficit
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Note: FE estimates and 95% confidence intervals of β0 ((b), (d) and (f)) and β1 ((a), (c) and (e)) from (15), with
κ = 1, and a triangular kernel. All regressions use preliminary deficit as running variable (xit). Figures (a) and
(b) use taxable income ex-ante as outcome variable, Figures (c) and (d) use a dummy variable indicating whether
individuals have changed residence as outcome variable, and Figures (e) and (f) use a dummy variable indicating
whether individuals are unemployed as outcome variable.
Figure 13: Kink and discontinuity from FE estimation of covariates used in loss aversion
analysis
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5.3 Neoclassical
Figure 9 suggested that there was some tendency for a positive kink in the deduction pattern
at the central government tax threshold. However, the evidence was not as clear as the
behavioral kink. We now turn to the corresponding formal analysis. Using the fixed effects
model, we estimate the probability of claiming a deduction as a function of taxable income
relative to the first central government kink. That is, in the estimated specification (15),
the running variable xit is now taxable income minus the level of first central government
kink. Using symmetric bandwidths around the zero reference point, we estimate (15) from
a taxable income of SEK ±30,000 at the most (5,216,645 observations) to SEK ±6,000 at
the least (1,064,770 observations). The maximum and minimum bandwidths are chosen to
roughly match the sample sizes of the corresponding maximum and minimum bandwidths
in the behavioral analysis above.
For reasons that will be discussed below, we start by running the regressions without
including the preliminary deficit variables (the preliminary deficit and preliminary deficit
interacted with positive deficit) as controls. Figure 15a shows the discontinuity estimates,
i.e., the estimates of β0 for the various bandwidths. The discontinuity is significant for very
low bandwidths, but becomes insignificant at bandwidth SEK ±7,500 (1,321,060 observa-
tions) and above. The kink estimates, i.e., the estimates of β1 are significant at bandwidths
of SEK ± 21,000 (3,665,869 observations) and above, as shown in Figure 14a. The regression
analysis thus seem to support that the positive kink, predicted by theory, is present in the
data.
We proceed by performing the same analysis for the covariates to check for potential
selection. We start with the change in residence and unemployment indicators. The
graphical evidence is seen in Figures 16b and 16c. Both variables seem to evolve smoothly
over the threshold. Figure 17d shows the discontinuity estimates for a dummy variable
indicating whether individuals have changed residence. Again, we conclude that there is
no significant discontinuity in that variable. Similarly, when looking at the kink estimates
in Figure 17c we find no significant kink, apart from in a small window (bandwidths SEK ±
9,000 to SEK ± 10,000). The same holds true for the unemployment indicator. There is no
strong evidence of a kink or discontinuity in Figure 17e and 17f below.
We now turn to the covariate that we left out of the analysis above, i.e. the prelimi-
nary deficit. It is immediately clear from the graphical evidence in Figure 16a below that
something dramatic is happening at the threshold; there is a small discontinuity and a very
large kink at the threshold. Clearly, individuals that are above the central government tax
threshold are much more prone to get a preliminary deficit than individuals with lower
incomes. This should not come as a surprise given that there is a random component to
income. Consider an individual that has a regular income that would put her slightly be-
low the threshold on a yearly basis. Her preliminary taxes will then typically not include a
central government component. If her income increases unexpectedly, for any reason such
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as overtime or a retroactive pay-raise, and the preliminary taxes paid on the extra income
is the same as on her regular payments, she will end up above the threshold and her deficit
will increase. The mirror image, unexpected reductions in the yearly income due to e.g. un-
employment or sickness absence, will push her below the threshold with a reduced deficit.
The dramatic change in preliminary deficit around the CGK is thus mechanically driven
and indicates that there is indeed a random component to income as well as preliminary
deficit. The formal kink and discontinuity estimates reported in Figures 17a and 17b below
confirm that the dramatic pattern in Figure 16a is significant.
All this implies that the small kink in deduction pattern, visible from the graphical
evidence in Figure 9 and confirmed econometrically in Figure 14a above (for larger band-
widths) may instead be driven by a behavioral response to increased deficits. To test this
hypothesis formally we rerun the analysis in Figures 14a and 15a above with deficit, and
deficit interacted with positive deficit, included as additional covariates. The results, shown
in Figures 14b and 15b, confirm the intuition described above. There is no longer any indi-
cation of a kink in deduction at the CGK; the estimates are extremely small and insignificant
for high bandwidths and turns negative and still insignificant for smaller bandwidths. The
discontinuity is also reduced compared to Figure 15a above; it is now negative for larger
bandwidths and positive for smaller bandwidths, however insignificant throughout the
whole range. We can interpret the comparison between the estimates in Figures 14a and
15a above and Figures 14b and 15b below as a horse-race between the behavioral effect
and the neoclassical effect. The small apparent neoclassical effects vanish when we include
the controls that capture the behavioral margin.25 The results in List (2003) suggest that
the more experienced, i.e., older, taxpayers would react more in accordance with neoclas-
sical theory than younger. Splitting the sample in taxpayers above and below the age of
40 we cannot reject the hypothesis is zero for either group. Hence, not even among the
experienced taxpayers we find reactions to standard economic incentives. In sum, all these
comparisons strengthen our interpretation that individuals are loss averse but do not react
to the standard monetary incentive to claim deductions.
25We have also ran the reversed experiment by doing the analogous comparison for the behavioral effects
estimated in Figures 11a and 11b above. In these regressions we included the controls that capture the neoclassical
reason to claim deductions, i.e., income and income interacted with income above the CGK. However, the
behavioral responses are completely unaffected by the inclusion of these covariates.
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(a) Neoclassical kink from FE estimation, without preliminary deficit as a covariate
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(b) Neoclassical kink from FE estimation, with preliminary deficit as a covariate
Note: FE estimates and 95% confidence intervals of of β1 from (15), using a dummy variable indicating
deductions for “other expenses” as outcome variable (∆it), taxable income relative to first CGK as
running variable (xit), κ = 1, and a triangular kernel.
Figure 14: Kink from FE estimation in neoclassical analysis
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(a) Neoclassical discontinuity from FE estimation, without preliminary deficit as a covariate
-.002
0
.002
.004
.006
es
tim
at
ed
 c
oe
ffi
ci
en
t
5 10 15 20 25 30
bandwidth (1000 SEK)
(b) Neoclassical discontinuity from FE estimation, with preliminary deficit as a covariate
Note: FE estimates and 95% confidence intervals of β0 from (15), using a dummy variable indicating
deductions for “other expenses” as outcome variable (∆it), taxable income relative to first CGK as
running variable (xit), κ = 1, and a triangular kernel.
Figure 15: Discontinuity from FE estimation in neoclassical analysis
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Figure 16: Neoclassical covariate (moving) by income
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Note: FE estimates and 95% confidence intervals of β0 ((b), (d) and (f)) and β1 ((a), (c) and (e)) from
(15), with κ = 1, and a triangular kernel. All regressions use taxable income relative to first central
government kink as a running variable (xit). Figures (a) and (b) use preliminary deficit as outcome
variable, Figures (c) and (d) use a dummy variable indicating whether individuals have changed
residence as outcome variable, and Figures (e) and (f) use a dummy variable indicating whether
individuals are unemployed as outcome variable.
Figure 17: Kink and discontinuity from FE estimation of covariates used in neoclassical
analysis (moving dummy)
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6 Conclusion
We study a panel of Swedish working age taxpayers’ behavior when filing their tax returns
for the income years 1999–2006. The Swedish tax system provides two natural experiments
related to deduction behavior along two separate margins: i) the preliminary tax deficit
and ii) a large kink (20 percentage points) in the income tax schedule, where a central
government tax kicks in. If taxpayers are loss averse, with zero preliminary balance as a
reference point, their incentives to make deductions increase sharply when entering the
domain with preliminary tax deficit. Also, taxpayers slightly above the governmental tax
kink have substantially higher (standard economic) incentives to claim deductions than
taxpayers slightly below the kink.
The research method is quasi-experimental using a regression kink and discontinuity
approach. Our findings indicate that the Swedish taxpayers are highly reference dependent
and loss averse and they do not react to standard monetary incentives. First, we find a
significant change in deduction behavior at zero preliminary deficit. That is, taxpayers
who have a preliminary tax deficit are more likely to claim deductions for “other expenses
for earning employment income” than those who have a preliminary surplus. The empir-
ical fixed-effects analysis indicates no selection on unobservables around the zero balance
threshold, which strengthens the causal interpretation. Loss aversion is the obvious candi-
date for explaining the result. Second, when not adjusting for incentives explained by loss
aversion, i.e., preliminary deficit, we do find some evidence of an increase in deduction
behavior at a threshold where the marginal tax rate jumps by 20 percentage point. These
preliminary findings are thus consistent with standard economic incentives. However,
taxpayers above the CGK have dramatically higher preliminary tax deficits compared to
taxpayers below the CGK. This is a mechanical relationship caused by the random com-
ponent of earned income. When we control for tax deficit, the kink in deduction behavior
around the CGK completely disappears. That is, the observed kink around the CGK is
also due to loss aversion, driven by the increased preliminary deficit. We thus find very
strong evidence that taxpayers suffer from loss aversion but no evidence of them reacting
to standard economic incentives.
How can we make sense of these results? The lack of response to the standard economic
incentives is consistent with many studies on wage earners bunching behavior (se e.g. Saez
(2010) and Bastani and Selin (2014)). When focusing on labor supply adjustments, the lack
of bunching can be explained by optimization frictions. However, when the margin of
adjustment is deduction, optimization frictions arguably make less sense. The fact that
we find strong loss-aversion reactions indicates that deductions are indeed sensitive to
incentives, and that individuals react without frictions when trying to avoid losses. So why
do tax payers not respond just as strongly to standard economic incentives? The usual
suspect is lack of salience. Having a tax deficit is arguably very salient. Perhaps much
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more salient than being above or below the CGK. Can we really expect people to know
exactly where the CGK is located? Earlier studies indicate that taxpayers have a very low
knowledge of the exact income threshold where the central government tax kicks in (see
Flood et al. (2013). This low knowledge may indeed help explain why wage earners do
not bunch at the kink point by adjusting their labor income, as discussed in Bastani and
Selin (2014). However, when filing tax returns, workers do receive information regarding
whether they are above or below the CGK. This information is actually written on the
preliminary tax return, on the same page the preliminary balance is reported (see Figure
18 in the appendix). The preliminary tax returns clearly state how much money you
should pay in central government tax; if the figure is zero, you are below the kink, and
if it is positive, you are above the kink. A rudimentary understanding of the income tax
system would thus suffice. This means that the average taxpayer would have to be highly
inattentive in order to not have a rough knowledge of her incentives to make a deduction.
In his recent bestseller, Richard Thaler coins the term "misbehaving" (Thaler, 2015) to
indicate when people deviate from standard economic theory. Embracing this terminology,
we can conclude that Swedish tax-payers are certainly not well behaved: not only are they
highly loss averse, they also fail to react to textbook economic incentives.
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A Appendix
Figure 18 shows an example of the preliminary tax return where the first red arrow indicates the information
about central governmental tax. This specific taxpayer was not supposed to pay this tax during this specific year;
hence, the line is left blank. The second one indicates whether the taxpayer has taxes due or could expect a refund
(in this case a refund).
 
Note: An example of the page in the preliminary tax return with information about both central governmental tax
and preliminary deficit. The upper red arrow indicates the row with information about central governmental tax.
This specific taxpayer was not supposed to pay central governmental tax in this year; hence, the second column
in the central government tax row is left blank. For those who are above the central government threshold, the
column states the amount of the individuals’ annual central governmental tax. The lower red arrow indicates the
row with information about whether the taxpayer has taxes due or could expect a refund. The second column
shows the amount of the preliminary surplus. In this case the taxpayer has a surplus of SEK 1,608. If the taxpayer
had a deficit of the same amount, the column would state a negative amount, SEK -1,608.
Figure 18: Preliminary tax return
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